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Decision Support for Countering 
Terrorist Threats against 
Transportation Networks
By Richard Adler, Ph.D. and Jeff Fuller
Introduction: Challenges for Managing Risks from 
Terrorism
Improved intelligence sharing is helping Homeland Security authorities 
identify terrorist threats more effectively. However, this progress accentu-
ates key "downstream" problems for decision-makers:
•   Analyzing credible but imprecisely defined terrorist threats.
•   Formulating strategies to mitigate risks from terrorist threats and 
understanding their likely consequences and costs.
•   Revalidating and adapting strategies as the risk landscape evolves over 
time.
Conventional decision support methods and tools lack the horsepower 
required to address these program-level tasks effectively. For example, 
spreadsheets and other simulation engines excel at manipulating numeric 
data, projecting quantitative trends, and the like. However, they fall short 
in depicting and leveraging critical knowledge about security that is 
largely qualitative, uncertain, and incomplete. Key examples include 
intelligence about terrorist objectives, resources, and behaviors; eco-
nomic forces and technological trends; and the challenges of implement-
ing complex security initiatives. Lacking robust frameworks for analyzing 
the dynamics of terrorism risk and risk mitigation strategies, authorities 
are seriously hampered in their efforts to protect the nation.
This article presents a dynamic decision support methodology for 
counter-terrorism decision support. The initial sections introduce basic 
objectives and challenges of terrorism risk analysis and risk management. 
The remainder of the paper describes TRANSEC, a decision support 
framework for defining, validating, and monitoring strategies focused on 
managing terrorism risks to international transportation networks. The 
methodology and software tools underlying TRANSEC are applicable to 
other homeland security problems, such as critical infrastructure and bor-
der protection.
Adler and Fuller: Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transpo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
44
Analyzing Risks from Terrorist Attacks
Classic risk assessment methodologies focus on identifying relevant 
threats and estimating their relative likelihoods and expected impacts.1 
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has adopted 
the following analytic construct for assessing risks, not only from terrorist 
attacks but also from natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, 
and epidemics:2
Risk = Threat x Consequence x Vulnerability.
For terrorism risks, analysts evaluate threats by estimating the capability 
and intent of terrorists to carry out specific types of attacks against identi-
fied targets, such as driving a truck carrying a bomb into a facility in the 
Port of Miami or firing a shoulder-launched missile (MANPAD) at an air-
craft from the perimeter of Los Angeles International Airport. Vulnerabil-
ity is estimated in terms of physical accessibility and security defenses 
already in place to deter or prevent attacks. Finally, Consequence hinges 
on estimated impacts, such as loss of life and economic effects should an 
attack succeed.
For example, within DHS, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has 
developed and deployed a maritime security analysis model (MSRAM).3 
MSRAM analyzes the threat of terrorist attacks against 63 classes of 
potential targets in and around the nation's ports and waterways, includ-
ing various types of passenger and cargo vessels, terminals and other port 
facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure. Twenty-three attack modes 
are proposed, such as aquatic mines or Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs), small aircraft, bomb-laden trucks, and hijacked vessels used as 
weapons. MSRAM depicts the threat for each such target-attack mode 
pairings via quantitative estimates of terrorist intent and capabilities to 
carry out these scenarios, together with confidence levels in these judg-
ments. These data are supplied by the USCG Intelligence Coordination 
Center (ICC).
MSRAM estimates vulnerability as a function of three factors: Attack 
Achievability, System Security, and Target Hardness. Attack Achievability 
is assessed in terms of factors such as geography, weather, and the com-
plexity of the attack mode. System Security measures the capability of key 
government and commercial security authorities to interdict attacks. 
Finally, Target Hardness refers to the target's estimated capability to 
withstand particular attack modes, such as a bomb blast or release of toxic 
chemicals, and maintain operations.
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Finally, MSRAM assesses the consequences of target-attack mode combi-
nations in terms of estimated deaths, injuries, primary economic and 
environmental impacts, effects on national security, and symbolic signifi-
cance. Economic impacts include property damage and immediate costs 
of disruption and substitution. Primary economic consequences can be 
mitigated by the capability of security actors to respond effectively to suc-
cessful attacks; e.g., neutralizing attackers, putting out fires, providing 
emergency medical services, decontaminating sites, etc. MSRAM also 
attempts to estimate the secondary economic impacts of attacks, such as 
the net losses to commercial aviation from disruptions in air travel follow-
ing the 9/11 attack. Mitigating factors for the component of consequence 
include redundancy of facilities (e.g., multiple cranes or docks) and pre-
paredness to recover operational capabilities promptly.
The USCG deploys MSRAM as a PC-based application, backed by exten-
sive training. Captains of the Port and their staff apply MSRAM to assess 
risks at their (local) level on an annual basis. The USCG rolls up MSRAM 
data and applies it to prioritize critical maritime security investments at 
local, regional, and national levels.
Managing Risk from Terrorist Threats
Once risks have been assessed through models such as MSRAM, the ques-
tion naturally arises of reducing exposure to these risks. In other words, 
how do we manage risks once they are analyzed uniformly to allow rank-
ing and other types of comparisons?
In particular, what allocations of and investments in new personnel, 
training, systems, technologies, and other resources will improve capabil-
ities to prevent attacks and to respond effectively should interdiction 
efforts fail? How and when will these strategies reduce vulnerabilities and 
consequences? How robust are these strategies to changes in adversaries' 
tactics and weapons? Finally, how can risk mitigation activities and 
investments be managed as a diversified portfolio to maximize reduction 
of risk exposure not only across geographically distributed threats and 
targets, but also across plausible future conditions?
Managing risks from terrorist threats generally involves two types of situ-
ational interventions.4 First, exposure to risk can be addressed by reduc-
ing vulnerabilities. For example, buildings or building complexes such as 
ports or airports can be hardened by adding barriers around their perime-
ters, making them harder to attack with vehicles carrying bombs. Simi-
larly, adding security patrols or sensor systems reduces vulnerability by 
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increasing the likelihood of deterring or interdicting terrorists before they 
can carry out their threatened attacks.
Second, assuming that attacks are successful, risk can be managed by 
improving response and recovery capabilities thereby minimizing or con-
taining consequences. For example, improving communication systems 
and coordination capabilities of local law enforcement, other first 
responders, and relevant commercial or government property owners 
enhances response capabilities and mitigation consequences. These inter-
ventions can also reduce vulnerability by improving detect/decide/
engage/defeat functions of system security.
Systems designed to analyze risk can often be extended to manage risk, at 
least at a basic level. First, one applies the given model to analyze risk at 
the present time based on inputs that describe the current security condi-
tions (e.g., threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences). Next, one com-
putes risk based on inputs that are altered to reflect one or more proposed 
security measures. Finally, comparing current risk to the risk projected 
for projected new security programs yields a differential analysis of risk 
management strategies. MSRAM, for example, provides this kind of 
"before-after" capability.
Additional Risk Mitigation Factors
We contend that methods for assessing risk mitigation strategies must 
reflect four additional critical factors in order to be truly effective. These 
factors relate to financial and dynamic temporal aspects of risk and risk 
reduction.
First, reducing risk (by improving security effectiveness) is not a discrete 
action undertaken at a single instant, but rather an extended process that 
is executed over time. In particular, security measures require months to 
years to develop, deploy, and perfect. They cannot simply be "switched 
on." And their success in achieving their objectives is by no means guar-
anteed: programs may be deficient in design or execution or they may not 
yield the anticipated effects. In short, managing risk involves a more 
granular approach than simply measuring risk exposure or reduction via 
"snapshot" measurements or extrapolations at discrete points in time.
Second, the risk "landscape" will inevitably evolve continually over the 
periods it takes to implement new security strategies: socio-political and 
economic conditions shift, technologies advance, and so on. Equally 
important, terrorist groups detect and respond to changes in their envi-
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ronment, adapting their objectives, capabilities, tactics, and strategies 
accordingly. This includes working to circumvent announced security 
measures underway and/or shifting to other targets and methods. Risk 
management methods must explicitly anticipate the potential impact of 
these exogenous factors in designing and executing risk reduction strate-
gies.
Third, from a policy standpoint, risk management strategies cannot be 
decoupled from their financial "footprints:" decisions to adopt new strate-
gies must explicitly estimate the anticipated costs of competing 
approaches and weigh them against projected benefits. Cost-benefit 
tradeoffs (over time) are particularly critical to portfolio-based 
approaches to minimizing risk across threats and geographical locales.
Finally, focusing on cost and (change over) time materially affects the 
structuring of risk strategies. Currently, security programs tend to be 
designed monolithically, to achieve a specific level of risk reduction at 
some target point in the future. Real options theory suggests a more 
fine-grained approach.5 Originally developed for designing financial 
derivatives, options theory is increasingly used in high-risk, high-cost 
decisions involving drug research and development and manufacturing 
capacity. The core idea is to segment programs into smaller pieces with 
several checkpoints in the future where go/no-go decisions can be made 
based on the situation and value of the investment at those points in time. 
For example, factories can be designed in a modular manner to provide an 
initial expansion short-term, with options to expand incrementally (and 
cost effectively) if future product demand warrants it.
Security programs can be structured more flexibly through options to 
achieve escalating levels of protection that can be adopted to reflect risk 
exposure as it evolves over time. Terrorism is an economically asymmet-
ric threat: our adversaries seek to provoke us to invest in ruinously costly 
national-scale countermeasures by carrying out (or merely threatening to 
stage) single attacks via new modes (e.g., chemical weapons, recruiting 
indigenous vs. foreign suicide bombers). A more adaptive approach that 
accommodates staging security programs to achieve deterrence before 
moving onto prevention is an essential enhancement in our thinking 
about counter-terrorism.
In short, analyzing risk tends to be a static activity anchored to specific 
points in time. However, risk evolves continually, driven by changes in the 
world at large. Correspondingly, managing risk is an inherently dynamic 
and, ideally, adaptive process: authorities must anticipate both the evolu-
tion of risks and extended program deployment cycles in devising new 
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security strategies, track risk reduction performance and changes in risk 
landscapes over time, and adjust strategies as appropriate.
The remainder of this article describes TRANSEC, a decision support tool 
that addresses these core aspects of managing terrorism risk. TRANSEC 
is implemented using advanced scenario-based "what-if" dynamic simu-
lation and analysis software called ForeTell.6 The system helps authorities 
evaluate risk reduction strategies by projecting the consequences of pro-
posed security measures and comparing their capabilities (and costs) to 
reduce risk from terrorist threats over time and across alternate future 
conditions.
Background–Terrorism Threats Involving 
Transportation Networks
TRANSEC addresses two categories of terrorist threats against transpor-
tation systems:
•   Interdicting direct terrorist attacks against international transports 
such as vessels and aircraft and debarkation points such as ports and 
airports;
•   Interdicting attempts to transfer individual terrorists or materiel into 
our country for purposes of carrying out attacks later.7
Domestic homeland security efforts today focus primarily on the first cat-
egory ? threats of direct attack. As noted earlier, the canonical risk analy-
sis construct is:
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence.
Numerous challenges arise in estimating these three factors uniformly 
and accurately, but the basic framework is relatively clear.8
The terror transfer threat consists of the movement of terrorists and 
materiel (including components of weapons of mass destruction) into our 
country via independent transport modes from multiple countries and 
shipping points. Once inside our borders, terrorists and materiel can be 
moved via domestic transport modes and assembled to perpetrate attacks 
elsewhere.
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Terrorist transfer threats are open-ended in nature because they involve 
the staging of resources into our country prior to attacks. The standard 
Risk construct does not apply because specific targets and attack modes 
are generally not known at this stage.
However, transfer threats cannot be ignored or dismissed simply because 
they are complex and challenging to model and analyze. On the contrary, 
we contend that the risks are too great not to attempt a systematic ana-
lytic approach, despite the inherent difficulties. In particular, we argue 
that making any progress on blocking transfer threats will reduce the 
scope of the "downstream" problem of interdicting terrorists as they 
attempt to launch direct attacks from within our borders. Hence, inter-
dicting such piecemeal transfer threats before they penetrate our borders 
is a critical security priority.
TRANSEC–Decision Support for Managing 
Terrorism Risks in Transportation9
TRANSEC models risk assessments for both (or either) terrorist transfer 
and transportation system attack threats. It then models and helps refine 
and validate strategies for mitigating those risks. TRANSEC utilizes open 
source intelligence,10 expert judgments of security analysts, and inputs 
produced by other risk analysis tools such as MSRAM.
TRANSEC employs a dynamic multi-tiered decision model that abstracts 
terrorist threats into a network. The nodes of this network consist of the 
following entity types: Terrorist Groups, Countries of Origin, Points of 
Embarkation, International Transport Modes, Country of Destination, 
and associated Points of Debarkation. Figure 1 depicts this network model 
from a stylized geospatial perspective.
For transfer threats, TRANSEC breaks out two categories of risk—trans-
fers of individuals and material from foreign countries to our borders. 
Examples of materiel include conventional and chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons (or weapon components).
For direct attack threats, TRANSEC focuses on two types of targets—
Debarkation Points and International Transports. To minimize input 
requirements, the current version clusters attack modes into three catego-
ries: Emplaced, Standoff, and Hijack. Emplaced means that terrorists 
launch attacks aboard vessels, planes, trains, etc., while Standoff means 
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that attacks are staged from Debarkation Point perimeters. Hijack mode 
only applies to Transports and assumes that the terrorists use the plane or 
vessel as a weapon.
Figure 1: TRANSEC Transfer Threat Network Model
Following MSRAM's model for analyzing Risk elements, TRANSEC posits 
three distinct categories of actors with capabilities to detect and/or inter-
dict terrorist personnel and materiel: national governments, local law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs), and owner/operators (OOs) of transport 
modes and supporting facilities. Each category of security actor has a dis-
tinct scope of authority, responsibilities, and operations; resources; and 
local presence.
For example, in maritime security scenarios, OOs are assumed to be com-
mercial or civil entities that operate passenger or cargo vessels and termi-
nal facilities at seaports. The lead domestic national authority for 
maritime security is the U.S. Coast Guard. LEAs in the United States 
include state and city police departments and emergency management 
agencies. Collaboration among security players to leverage complemen-
tary detection, deterrence, and engagement capabilities is critical for 
effective interdiction.
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TRANSEC defines a set of quantitative performance measures, called Sys-
tem Security Effectiveness (SE) metrics. SE metrics are defined for each 
class of security actor and represent their capabilities to interdict transfer 
threats at Embarkation, Transit, and Debarkation points and to interdict 
attack threats at Transit and Debarkation points. These metrics are 
assigned values from 0 to 100 and can be annotated with comments. 
Table 1 summarizes TRANSEC's primary performance data elements. 
Data elements for direct attack threats are shown in italics; all other data 
support transfer threat modeling.
Table 1: TRANSEC Security Metrics
TRANSEC Entity Security Metric/Datum
Metric 
Usage
Point of Embarkation 
Security effectiveness of Owner/
Operators, Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies, and National Govern-
ment in Port vs. Transfer Threat of 
Terrorists and Materiel
Probability of Interdicting Terror-
ists and Materiel
Update
Output
International Trans-
port (by mode/cate-
gory) 
Security effectiveness of Owner/
Operators, and National Govern-
ment in Port vs. Transfer Threat of 
Terrorists and Materiel 
Security effectiveness vs. Standoff 
and Emplaced/Hijacked attack 
modes
Probability of Interdicting Terror-
ists and Materiel
Threat, Vulnerability, Conse-
quence, and Risk of Attack via 
Standoff and Emplaced/Hijacked 
attack modes
Update
Output
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Point of Debarkation 
Security effectiveness of Owner/
Operators, Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies, and National Govern-
ment in Port vs. Transfer Threat of 
Terrorists and Materiel
Security effectiveness vs. Standoff 
and Emplaced attack modes
Probability of Interdicting Terror-
ists and Materiel Aggregate Trans-
fer Threat of Terrorist and 
Materiel (broken out by Point of 
Embarkation and Intl. Transport)
Threat, Vulnerability, Conse-
quence, and Risk of Attack via 
Standoff and Emplaced attack 
modes
Update
Output
Table 1: TRANSEC Security Metrics
TRANSEC Entity Security Metric/Datum
Metric 
Usage
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss3/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.3.5
Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks
53
Additional inputs include:
•   Estimated capability and intent of terrorist groups to initiate transfer 
threats of Terrorists and Materiel from specific countries11
•   Estimated capability and intent of terrorist group to carry out attacks 
against Transport and Debarkation Point nodes in Emplaced/Hijack 
and Standoff modes
•   Factors contributing to Vulnerability and Consequence of attack modes 
relating to International Transport or Debarkation Point nodes (e.g., 
vessels, aircraft, ports)
•   Assumptions about social, political, and economic forces; trends; and 
disruptive events that might take place over the duration of the security 
strategy 12
Finally, TRANSEC models counter-terrorism strategies via sets of secu-
rity measures. Each such measure specifies an allocation of existing 
resources and prospective investments to improve capabilities to interdict 
terrorist personnel and/or materiel prior to or upon arrival at our bor-
ders. Security measures are characterized in terms of three types of 
behavioral content:
1.  Projected schedules to acquire or develop and deploy the given mea-
sure, depicted as start date and duration (in months);
2. Projected costs, expressed in terms of estimated capital expenditures 
(for start-up) and annual outlays for ongoing operations, maintenance, 
and support;
3. Expert assessments as to how the measures will likely impact particular 
SE metrics over time.13 TRANSEC's "what-if" capabilities allow ana-
lysts to explore the impacts of alternate assumptions about how bene-
fits will occur or fail to materialize. The latter type of analysis is critical 
for assessing the potential impacts of delays, implementation errors, 
technology failures, and other types of programmatic risks on security 
effectiveness.
Table 2 lists several example Security Measures and their anticipated 
impacts. Generally, individual Security Measures impact only one or sev-
eral of the SE metrics tied to risk from transfer or attack threats.
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These inputs—transportation network nodes, security strategies and mea-
sures, environmental assumptions and events—collectively define a 
TRANSEC Scenario. Figure 2 depicts the taxonomy of entity types used to 
build TRANSEC Scenarios.14
Table 2: Example Security Measures (and Strategies)
Index Threat Type
Security Measure/
Strategy
Expected (Causal ) 
Impact
1 Direct Attack Security Training Pro-
gram for aircraft crew
Reduce vulnerability to 
emplaced attack on 
aircraft
2 Direct Attack Passenger Scanning 
Program for airport
Reduce vulnerability to 
emplaced attack on 
airport
3 Direct Attack Procurement Program 
to develop Emergency 
Medical Services capa-
bility
Reduce consequence 
of attack on airport
4 Direct Attack Combine Measures 1, 
2, and 3
Combine impacts 1,2, 3
5 Transfer Transportation 
Worker Identity Cre-
dential (TWIC) pro-
gram
Reduce transfer threat 
at Debarkation Points 
by controlling individ-
ual access 
6 Transfer Overseas Port Security 
Program to coordinate 
with and certify secu-
rity practices of foreign 
ports and authorities
Reduce transfer threat 
at Embarkation Points 
by controlling individ-
ual access and materiel
7 Transfer Intl Maritime Org. 
(IMO) Shipper Secu-
rity program to coordi-
nate with and certify 
security practices of 
owner/operators of 
vessels
Reduce transfer threat 
at Intl Transport nodes 
by controlling individ-
ual access and materiel
8 Transfer Combine Measures 5, 
6, and 7
Combine impacts 6,7,8
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Figure 2: Entity Taxonomy for TRANSEC
The TRANSEC software system incorporates a "what-if" simulation 
engine that dynamically projects the likely impacts of Security Measures 
and environmental influences to generate the following outputs, in 
monthly increments:
•   Updates to SE metrics at all nodes in the security network.
•   Probabilities of interdicting terrorists and material at Embarkation, 
Transit, and Debarkation points.
•   Net transfer threat risks of personnel and materiel at specific Points of 
Debarkation.
•   These projected values are broken out by specific combinations of 
Terrorist Groups, Points of Embarkation and International Trans-
port modes. For example, what is the risk of Transferring Personnel 
at the Port of Miami from al-Qaeda operating out of the Port of Ath-
ens via a break bulk cargo vessel?
•   Updated estimates of Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence and 
aggregate Risk for direct attacks, by mode, at International Transport 
and Point of Debarkation nodes.
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For direct attack threats, TRANSEC employs the standard Threat, Vulner-
ability, and Consequence construct to compute Risk. For transfer threats, 
TRANSEC employs a probabilistic computation using SE metrics adapted 
from standard failure models used by system reliability engineers. 
TRANSEC employs various other simulation techniques to model envi-
ronmental dynamics.15
TRANSEC's overall data processing architecture is summarized in Figure 
3. Inputs are indicated in green, while outputs are labeled in blue. The 
upper half of the diagram addresses threat from direct attack, while the 
lower portion focuses on transfer threats.
TRANSEC provides powerful analytic tools such as summary reports and 
graphic plots to reduce simulation data. These tools help analysts quickly 
compare projected outcomes to isolate the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of alternate strategies across diverse scenarios. Analysts can also 
drill down to determine how forces, trends, events, and security measures 
impacted risk or cost in particular months. Users can refine their security 
strategies to incorporate attractive features of competing approaches. The 
resulting strategies are robust in that they leave the country well pro-
tected despite our inherent uncertainty about the future.
A strategy, no matter how robust, must be executed effectively in order to 
be successful. TRANSEC supports the post-decision phase of the strategic 
life cycle with a monitoring mode: as time passes, programs are enacted. 
All the while, social, political, economic, and technological conditions 
change and terrorist groups evolve, adapting their capabilities, objectives, 
and methods in response to the evolving landscape and their analysis of 
our defenses.
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Figure 3: TRANSEC decision model architecture
Analysts use TRANSEC to update their Scenarios periodically to reflect 
current intelligence and re-project the chosen security strategy.16 If the 
projected outcomes are uniformly positive, the strategy has been revali-
dated. If not, TRANSEC acts as an Early Warning System, alerting author-
ities promptly to changing conditions and emerging problems. Analysts 
can diagnose the problems, alter (or replace) the current security strategy, 
and implement those midcourse corrections to ensure continued success.
The following figures illustrate sample outputs from TRANSEC, project-
ing counter-terrorism strategies described in Figure 2 above. For exam-
ple, Figure 4 displays comparative time series plots projecting the 
reduction of risk for transferring terrorists for two strategies. As the key 
indicates, one set of curves assumes that a transportation worker identity 
credential (TWIC) program is implemented, while the other set assumes a 
broader program that implements security measures that impact Embar-
kation Points, Transport Modes, and Debarkation Points.
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Figure 4: Example TRANSEC Time Series Output
Each curve depicts the risk for a transportation network path starting out 
from a particular Embarkation Point (e.g., Port of Athens) via one Trans-
port Mode (e.g., a cruise ship) into one Debarkation Point (e.g., Port of 
Miami). In this scenario, it is assumed that in month 12, Turkey joins the 
European Union. The analyst postulated that the impact of this event 
would be to increase the baseline transfer threat out of Europe (but not 
Libya), under the assumption that Turkey's border security is inferior to 
that of European Union countries, allowing freer movement of terrorists 
across EU country borders.
Figure 5 displays the corresponding curves for the transfer threat of mate-
riel. The lines signify no reduction of threats from materiel transfer 
ascribable to the TWIC program alone (as expected), while the curves for 
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the composite strategy (number 4 referenced in Figure 2) reflect threat 
reduction benefits from strategies targeting foreign ports and vessel oper-
ators.
Figure 5: Example TRANSEC Time Series Output
Finally, Figure 6 displays a spider (radar) chart comparing security effec-
tiveness metrics for Strategies 1 (TWIC only, turquoise) and 4 (Composite 
strategy, red) four years into the future. Comparative analytics help deci-
sion-makers isolate relative strengths and weaknesses of security strate-
gies and identify areas for refinement.
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Figure 6: Example TRANSEC Spider (Radar) Plot Output
Conclusions
Managing risk from terrorism threats is a dynamic and adaptive process. 
Security strategies must anticipate ongoing evolution of environmental 
conditions and adaptive responses by terrorists in response to these 
changes and our defensive initiatives.
The critical challenge is to devise a collection of complementary security 
measures that address the diverse components of terrorist threats—tar-
gets and transfer nodes, attack modes, vulnerability, and consequence 
factors. Such strategic portfolios must (1) deliver broad spectrum risk 
reduction in a cost effective manner and (2) anticipate changing risk land-
scapes and incomplete knowledge.
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Unfortunately, no one can predict the future reliably. Equally regrettably, 
no closed-end (computationally tractable) equations exist to "optimize" 
counter-terrorism preparedness investments.
TRANSEC aims for the next best thing, which is to identify and manage 
robust counter-terrorism strategies. A robust strategy is one that appears 
likely to produce superior reductions of risk across a range of plausible 
possible futures in comparison to competing security portfolios. 
TRANSEC employs scenario-based "what-if" simulations to model risk 
landscapes and explore and compare alternate strategies. Authorities can 
apply the same projective methods to monitor and adjust strategies as 
they are executed.
TRANSEC provides a safe virtual environment for practicing 
counter-terrorism strategies and learning from simulated rather than real 
mistakes. It thereby reduces risk and improves confidence and consis-
tency in strategic security decisions. In essence, TRANSEC allows author-
ities to "test drive" strategies much as consumers test drive cars before 
buying them to minimize costly surprises and disappointments.
TRANSEC focuses on terrorism threats relating to transportation sys-
tems. However, its underlying decision support methodology and soft-
ware tools are easily generalized to address other critical homeland 
security decisions such as critical infrastructure and border protection.
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